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workplace, but otherwise his analysis does not stray beyond Canadian borders. 
The demands of increasingly mobile capital and the pressures on domestic gov- 
ernments, however, increasingly come from abroad, and Vogt's prescriptive 
analysis of property and democracy needs to address the phenomenon of glo- 
bilization, its dangers and its possibilities. 
Although Vogt suggests a potentially attractive vision of enhanced proper- 
ty rights, the analysis is too fleeting to satisfy the specialist, and not engaging 
enough to capture a larger imagination. This is too bad because Vogt's efforts 
to reclaim the idea of property and to put it to work for those whose claims have 
not been accorded such privileged protection is long overdue. 
Douglas C. Harris 
York University 
Michael Torigian, Every Factory a Fortress: The French Labor Movement in the 
Age of Ford and Hitler (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1999). 
Following the 1936 electoral victory of the Popular Front coalition, the 
French Third Republic faced the biggest wave of labour unrest in its history, 
with over 1.8 million workers on strike during June of that year alone. Given 
the heady atmosphere extant in the wake of an historic left-wing triumph, one 
might think that Marceau Pivert, leader of the pro-revolutionary faction of 
the French Socialist Party, captured the spirit of the time when he entitled one 
of his newspaper editorials "Everything Is Possible." But in fact, the situation 
was far less straightforward. L1Humanit&, the organ of the French Communist 
Party (PCF), immediately countered that "Everything Is Not Possible." This 
encapsulated the new, "pragmatic" approach the party had adopted as a lead- 
ing architect of the Popular Front, in stark contrast to its hardline revolution- 
ary stance of only a few years earlier. Moreover, even Pivert's concrete 
demands were more limited than his rhetoric implied, concentrating upon 
wage increases and the election of workers' delegates.' 
Insofar as the working class was concerned, then, there was a sharp con- 
trast between the tremendous expectations aroused by the Popular Front, and 
the limited changes wrought by the government of the Socialist leader Leon 
Blum. To be sure, the Matignon Accords - hurriedly signed so as to end the 
strike wave - ushered in the 40-hour work week and significant wage increas- 
es for some. But by 1938, most historians of contemporary France agree, they 
had been undermined by continuing economic problems, a growing pressure 
to increase armaments output, a vigorous (an4 many would add, vindictive) 
employer counter-offensive, and bitter political conflict. 
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It is this last factor which most interests Michael Torigian in his study of 
the Paris metal industry during the era of the Popular Front. Asserting that 
"the labor movement is inherently non-political, serving as a vehicle neither 
for a party nor an ideology" (X), he contends that the most effective unions 
are those which follow an English or German model. Those organizations 
worked to establish an enduring presence in the factories, and engaged in 
party politics only in support of such goals. In France, conversely, unions 
faced a strong state, and were weak in the factory. This made the Parisian 
mttallos and many other workers more inclined to engage in "politics" rather 
than unionism, with ultimately deleterious results. 
Torigian begins his account by emphasizing the structural changes which 
took place in the metal industry during the interwar period. Hitherto France 
had been characterized by gradual industrial growth and the persistence of a 
sizeable rural sector, but with the advent of World War I a shift towards more 
"American-style" methods took place. By the end of the 1920s, the "Fordist- 
Taylorist mode of production"(9) had been widely introduced. For the work- 
ing class, the social consequences included a narrowing of their defined 
tasks, and a growing sense of anomie in the midst of what Torigian deems a 
superficial mass culture. The union movement could provide few alternatives 
to this new order. It was "political" in orientation, and sharply divided 
between the General Confederation of Labour (CGT) and the Communist- 
dominated General Confederation of Unitary Labour (CGTU). While the lat- 
ter did establish a presence among Parisian metal workers, it could only offer 
"a proletarian counter-society [which] was ... less an alternative to liberal 
society than a mass or democratized version of it" (25). 
The ideological character, and thus in Torigian's view the long-term inef- 
ficacy, of French unionism was further enhanced by the crisis of the Third 
Republic during the 1930s. In fairness, the onset of the Great Depression was 
initially accompanied by greater attention on the part of the Communists to 
shopfloor issues. But the 6 February, 1934, riots, during which a bevy of 
mostly ultra-nationalist groups had marched on the Chamber of Deputies, 
quickly sidetracked this trend. Confronted with pressure from their militants 
to cooperate with other groups against the domestic far right, as well as 
Soviet desires to see France become an ally in containing Nazi Germany, the 
PCF and CGTU worked towards building the Popular Front coalition with the 
Socialists and the centrist Radical party. Indeed, the two wings of the labour 
movement reunified under the banner of the CGT in 1936, though the 
restructured organization would experience serious internal tensions. 
Though the fusion was the result of political pressures, Torigian con- 
cedes that in general the rise of the Popular Front greatly boosted worker con- 
fidence, and "had also made the daily problems of the shop floor - the bread- 
and-butter issues of industry - matters of general political concern" (92). 
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Nevertheless, in the second half of the book he emphasizes that the coalition 
was always beset by deep fissures, implying that since many of its constituent 
elements were not focussed upon instilling a union-based consciousness in 
the workers, its achievements were doomed to be ephemeral. Thus, while the 
strike wave which began in 1936 was accompanied by a massive growth in 
CGT membership, and did pose challenges to the social structure, most of the 
new supporters were "slaves of political ritual," with little inclination to fol- 
low "experienced union leadersW(l20). Yet although the Communists had cap- 
italized upon the situation to extend their support base, by appealing to the 
tradition of Jacobin Republicanism, Torigian concludes that the expansion 
was less the result of their machinations than the conformist mass society in 
which the workers lived. 
That was not the perception of contemporaries such as the Syndicats ten- 
dency within the CGT, which criticized the Communists for "colonizing" the 
unions, and for their subservience to Moscow's strategy for confronting 
Nazism, which they believed entailed the risk of war. Thus, as early as the fall 
of 1936 the organization was divided into three factions, with the centrists led 
by Lion Jouhaux unsuccessfully seeking to bridge the gap between the 
Communists and the Syndicats group. Neither a faltering economy, nor an 
increasingly powerful counter-offensive by the employers, served to reinvig- 
orate pro-unity impulses. Furthermore, since the unions' victories were so 
closely tied to the political constellation obtaining in 1936, any reconfigura- 
tion could, and soon did, lead to an erosion of those gains. Once Blum's 
administration retreated from some of its reforms, and then gave way to more 
conservative governments, the rnhallos found themselves increasingly on the 
defensive. Tens of thousands quit; those who remained suspected that their 
own leaders had subordinated the interests of workers to foreign policy con- 
cerns and governmental stability. 
Torigian provides a detailed reconstruction of the disheartening, and 
sometimes overlooked, labour struggles which ensued, culminating in the 
attempted one-day general strike of 30 November, 1938, when the metal 
workers and their colleagues were "thoroughly outmatched" (170) by the 
government of ~doua rd  Daladier. Thereafter, he argues, demoralization con- 
tinued into the drble de guerre of 1939-40. The economic recovery which 
began in 1938, and the somewhat larger pay packets which resulted, made the 
situation only slightly more bearable. Political fractiousness within the union 
movement also continued, reaching its peak in the wake of the Nazi-Soviet 
Pact of August 1939, which was followed by a dramatic shift in the official 
position of the Communists against the war effort, and thereafter their expul- 
sion from the CGT. In Torigian's view, the connection between such distract- 
ing conflicts and the catastrophic defeat of 1940 is clear: "This half decade 
of violent contention - with its sitdown strikes and vengeful lock-outs, mass 
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demonstrations and street murders - undermined whatever community of 
sentiment and self-sacrifice had previously defined the nation" ( l  90). 
Such assertions have been challenged; recent scholarship has pointed to 
a growing determination, by 1939, on the part of the French public to resist 
the Nazis.2 Torigian concedes that by the spring of 1940, the country's aircraft 
and tank production had begun to overtake that of Germany. While this may 
seem to be a relatively minor point to make about a book dealing primarily 
with unions during the pre-war decade, the author's views on this matter are 
indicative of the very high standards he has set for French society, especially 
the labour movement. Few would dispute his contentions about the Popular 
Front's profound shortcomings, and his characterization of the union move- 
ment as politicized is sound. But the question of the extent to which union- 
ism can and should be divorced from "formal" politics is a complex one. 
Of course, Torigian does not argue that the union leaders should have dis- 
engaged themselves altogether. Rather, his concern is that they were imbri- 
cated in party manoeuvring to the extent that they rendered their members 
highly vulnerable to the vagaries of day-to-day politics. Yet under the cir- 
cumstances, calls for non-political unionism could seem risky. Elements of 
the far right, such as Lieutenant-Colonel Franqois de La Rocque's Parti Social 
Franqais (PSF), sought to appeal to workers by calling for the establishment 
of "non-political7' unions - but within the framework of an authoritarian cor- 
poratist state. As the author points out, such movements eagerly capitalized 
upon any problems the left-wing unions encountered. 
More generally, it is crucial to remember that the stakes in the 1930s 
were very high. The PSF alone had approximately one million members, and 
the French left had plenty of other enemies. The threat of a right-wing 
takeover between 1934 and 1936 was real to many, and time was of the 
essence. Given the relatively weak levels of union consciousness which 
Torigian himself highlights, it is perhaps unsurprising that appeals to defend 
the Republic, invoked on past occasions, were re-deployed to build a coali- 
tion in a time of urgent crisis. As the author points out, the Republican tradi- 
tion was ambivalent as far as workers were concerned. Yet it was sufficiently 
pliable to build a broad-based (albeit fragile) movement, even though the 
Communist leadership can certainly be accused of a degree of cynicism in 
their appropriation of it. 
As my dissent from some of its conclusions suggests, this is a stimulat- 
ing work, which raises important questions about the character and strategy 
of the interwar French labour movement. It is also written with verve; 
Torigian does a commendable job of reconstituting the perplexing socio- 
political context in which the m$tallos operated. The activities of the various 
union tendencies and left-wing political parties, but also the employers, the 
state, and the right, are smoothly integrated into a fast-paced analytical nar- 
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rative. In sum, this is a solid contribution to the political history of the French 
labour movement, one which readers both familiar with and new to the sub- 
ject will find engaging. 
Sean Kennedy 
University of New Brunswick 
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Allan Antliff, Anarchist Modernism: Art, Politics, and the First American 
Avant-Garde (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
I imagine I am not alone in having grown up with the definitions of anar- 
chy memorably advanced by Johnny Rotten (aka John Lydon) and the Sex 
Pistols in their trenchant cultural analysis of 1977, "Anarchy in the U.K." 
Between repetitions of the chorus ("I wanna be anarchy"), RottenILydon 
snarls two phrases that encapsulate a common understanding of anarchy: 
"Don't know what I want, but I know how to get it," and "I give a wrong 
time, stop a traffic line." We might nominate these the personal and polit- 
ical faces of contemporary commonsense anarchy. While the former artic- 
ulates a drive toward untrammeled self-gratification, the latter implies a 
repertoire of strategies for interrupting business as usual and preventing 
the hostile corporate takeover of the lifeworld (the line continues "your 
future dream is a shopping scheme"). The lines certainly capture an anar- 
chy richer than is often imagined in more academic accounts. They pre- 
serve an understanding of anarchy as tricksterish, libidinal, humorous and 
creative as well as angry and potentially destructive. 
One of the most useful and impressive things about Allan Antliff's 
fine study of anarchism in American politics, culture, and art between 
1908 and 1920 is the success with which it conveys precisely the multiple 
and creative aspects of anarchism condensed and recirculated by Johnny 
Rotten. By this, I do not mean simply to say that Antliff recovers the 
